Proud to be an American
America is a good country. America is a great country. The United States of America is the greatest country in the world. These three statements represent varying levels of American patriotism. Personally, I side with the last of these three statements, and feel America is the greatest country in the world. Some may say this is an overly bold, even arrogant statement. Others are often too steeped in political correctness to render an honest response. Some may even say that this is outrageous and insults the rest of the world. However the fact remains that America has been, and continues to be, the beacon of hope for those less fortunate. We are a country founded by immigrants, who openly embrace the hungry, sick, and neglected of the world. So, rather than “apologize” for American greatness and downplay our standing in the world, I feel compelled to openly express my love for country. I feel that the best way to express this love is through service to one’s country. Thus, my love for country, desire to help others, and inherent sense of duty compel me to proudly serve the greatest country in the world.
In his 1962 Thayer Award acceptance speech, Gen Douglas McArthur delivered his famous “Duty, Honor, Country” speech to the United States Corps of Cadets at West Point, NY. Macarthur captured the essence of what it truly means to serve, and inspired future generations to a lifetime of selfless service. Some may argue that this moniker of “duty, honor, country” is just another cliché; however, to me, these three “hallowed” words epitomize the meaning of selfless service and have inspired me throughout my military career. My love for country springs from these values and, in turn, inspires me to give back through service.
As a young Cub Scout, I learned the meaning of the Scout motto, “Do a good turn daily” and made it a part of my everyday life. This good turn did not need to be anything elaborate or grand; rather, the intent of the slogan is to raise awareness to the needs of others and, if able, to lend a helping hand. But how can helping others be seen as service to one’s country? To understand this, it is necessary to contemplate the various ways in which a person can serve. Are some types of service more important and/or significant than others? Just like people, service to one’s country can be expressed in a variety of ways. The term “serve your country” carries with it a connotation of military service or perhaps public service as in law enforcement. While this type of service is certainly noble, there are many other ways in which people can serve their country. For example, not everyone is willing and/or able to serve in the military, yet they can serve their country through charity work in the local community among other things. The unifying goal of service can be seen as helping other people. Therefore, by doing a good turn each day, we all contribute to the service of our country.
Duty can be defined as an obligation or responsibility placed upon oneself either personally or through the social constructs of society at large. We all are faced with various duties in our day to day lives, such as the duties of a mother, father, husband or wife. Many of these duties are self-evident and ones we willingly take on and embrace. Other types of duty originate from our shared values as Americans, our sense of patriotism and love of country. These feelings inherently inspire us to give back in some manner. I have always felt tremendous pride in The United States of America, and realize that this great country has provided me with many wonderful opportunities. So in reflecting upon what this country has provided me, I inherently feel a sense of obligation to give back in some manner. In serving my country in the Armed Forces, I feel that I am fulfilling this debt to America, and at the same time, fighting to preserve this way of life for future generations.
I feel fortunate and blessed to have grown up in the bedrock of democracy and feel deeply indebted to America for all that she has given me. I feel compelled to fulfill this obligation through service in the profession of arms. Likewise, this service is aimed at preserving our American way of life for future generations. I want my own children to know and love the America I grew up with, and to experience all the opportunities this country offers. Freedom is not free, and it takes a deliberate and continuous effort to preserve the America many of us have grown to love. My love for country is not some abstract idea; rather, it is a concrete feeling from which flows a strong sense of patriotism and desire to serve. I am proud to be an American, and will continue to serve my country throughout my military career and beyond.
Stephen Resch
MAJ, US Army
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Monday, May 24, 2010
Friday, May 21, 2010
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Task Force
A significant force management challenge for the United States is maintaining large combat forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the United States’ sphere of interest. The cost of maintaining these forces in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan in relation to actual money spent, natural resources, international political capital, and human lives is enormous. From a financial perspective alone, by September 30, 2010, $1.05 trillion dollars will be spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[1] A central reason for this great cost and force management challenge is that the United States often enters these conflicts in a reactive manner and then displays little expertise in dealing with the issues. A possible solution to this problem is creating an insurgency/counterinsurgency task force which would assist the United States government in conducting preemptive counterinsurgency measures as a means for preventing debilitating conflicts like those mentioned above.
The first step in this process is recognizing that the United States has a problem. The United States was heavily involved in supporting the Mujahideen insurgency against Russia in Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989. After the Russians withdrew, the United States closed its eyes to the inevitable power struggle between competing factions, some with extreme religious and political views, which led to the eventual rise of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda then used their close relationship with the Taliban, a relationship forged over years of hard combat against Russia, to facilitate the 9-11 attacks against the United States. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a direct result of failed insurgency/counterinsurgency vision and strategy in post-1989 Afghanistan.
A similar problem existed with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Once the United States military removed Saddam Hussein from power, the United States leadership did not envision a possible insurgency from his supporters, even though history teaches that such an outcome was likely. The United States military then bungled counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, as it did in Afghanistan since 2001, at the costs of thousands of American lives and billions of dollars. In both cases, the United States government and military displayed an inadequate understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency theory and practice that led to severe consequences for the United States which include - besides the human and financial costs already mentioned - a weakening of the United States’ standing and legitimacy in the world community.
A possible solution to this problem is developing an interagency, joint task force whose charter is to address the issues of insurgency/counterinsurgency for the United States. This task force would be composed of experienced specialists knowledgeable in various aspects of insurgency/counterinsurgency such as historians, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, financial experts, linguists, intelligence analysts, scholars, media experts, and military personnel. Each discipline would have multiple specialists to ensure they have adequate expertise in the various regions and countries of the world the United States will likely become involved in. For instance, the task force might need scores of historians, dozens of sociologists, and a hundred analysts to effectively cover all the concerned areas of the world that range from the Middle East to Latin America.
There would be a large, standing core of full time specialists focused squarely on the issues of insurgency/counterinsurgency. However, various specialists and experts would be called upon as needed, as contractors, to help the task force. Importantly, the task force would be inclusive of the various United States agencies to capture the community’s collective expertise and get them, as institutions, to “buy in” to the task force. Such agencies would include the CIA, DIA, Department of Defense, DEA, and State Department to name the most prominent.
Creation of a task force with a diverse background of specialists is one part of the solution. To be an effective entity, all members of the task force would have to receive common, centralized training at an insurgency/counterinsurgency education center so they would work in union towards a common concept of an insurgency/counterinsurgency philosophy. Importantly, the education center would be an integral part of the task force and, over time, members of the task force would rotate through both operational and educational positions ensuring a more complete understanding of the insurgency/counterinsurgency issue. Furthermore, service at the education center would be a prized assignment as the task force as a whole would value most a fundamental understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency and the ability to convey this to others.
So, what does the United States gain from such a task force once it is up and running? We can take Iraq for an example. Once the United States leadership decided to invade Iraq in 2002, this leadership would have directed the task force to study the potential for insurgency after the overthrow of the Hussein regime. The task force could have predicted that the Sunni population, which comprises a fifth of the nation, would have an inherent interest in waging a guerrilla war to retain its former standing and influence. If the task force predicted such an outcome, as many independent experts did, then the task force would have subsequently advised the national leadership how to address the expected resistance movement.
The task force’s value, then, is not just in its predictive ability, but in its ability to give expert advice on how to confront an insurgency. As the Iraqi insurgency developed into a coherent movement, the task force would have provided the United States government with expert advice on how to proceed. Without such a task force, deadlyr mistakes by the United States, which could have been avoided, stoked the insurgency in Iraq like a hot poker in a dying fire. The resulting chain of events reflected a political, military, and intelligence community leadership with little or no understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency issues. An understanding that protecting the populace is more important than protecting yourself could have prevented such catastrophic blunders as Blackwater employees killing innocent people in an unrestrained manner. Understanding that prisons are an extension of the unconventional battlefield could have prevented the embarrassing, criminal, and counterproductive Abu Ghraib incident. Understanding that disbanding the entire Iraqi army and criminalizing Ba’athists could lead to an entrenched insurgency that would eventually kill thousands of American soldiers could have been snipped in the bud. The task force could have saved thousands of American lives, tens of thousands of Iraqi lives, saved the United States billions of dollars, and bolstered the United States' position in the world community.
In conclusion, the creation of a unified insurgency/counterinsurgency task force would better equip the United States to address the issue of insurgency/counterinsurgency wars which have been the dominant form of warfare since the end of World War II and which give every indication of continuing in the future. The current United States involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, and Mexico - to name just a few – underline the seriousness of the issue. An insurgency/counterinsurgency task force would provide an expert, experienced, diverse organization that could help the United States leadership avoid and prevent future counterinsurgency conflicts and help to more effectively resolve them when the United States does become involved. When one looks at the tens of thousands of American lives lost in costly guerrilla wars, from Vietnam to the present, and the impact on the United States economy and world standing, the importance of an insurgency/counterinsurgency task force becomes apparent.
[1] http://www.costofwar.com/ by the National Priorities Project
MAJ Lyon, Student, CGSC, Fort Belvoir, VA
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The first step in this process is recognizing that the United States has a problem. The United States was heavily involved in supporting the Mujahideen insurgency against Russia in Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989. After the Russians withdrew, the United States closed its eyes to the inevitable power struggle between competing factions, some with extreme religious and political views, which led to the eventual rise of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda then used their close relationship with the Taliban, a relationship forged over years of hard combat against Russia, to facilitate the 9-11 attacks against the United States. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a direct result of failed insurgency/counterinsurgency vision and strategy in post-1989 Afghanistan.
A similar problem existed with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Once the United States military removed Saddam Hussein from power, the United States leadership did not envision a possible insurgency from his supporters, even though history teaches that such an outcome was likely. The United States military then bungled counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, as it did in Afghanistan since 2001, at the costs of thousands of American lives and billions of dollars. In both cases, the United States government and military displayed an inadequate understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency theory and practice that led to severe consequences for the United States which include - besides the human and financial costs already mentioned - a weakening of the United States’ standing and legitimacy in the world community.
A possible solution to this problem is developing an interagency, joint task force whose charter is to address the issues of insurgency/counterinsurgency for the United States. This task force would be composed of experienced specialists knowledgeable in various aspects of insurgency/counterinsurgency such as historians, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, financial experts, linguists, intelligence analysts, scholars, media experts, and military personnel. Each discipline would have multiple specialists to ensure they have adequate expertise in the various regions and countries of the world the United States will likely become involved in. For instance, the task force might need scores of historians, dozens of sociologists, and a hundred analysts to effectively cover all the concerned areas of the world that range from the Middle East to Latin America.
There would be a large, standing core of full time specialists focused squarely on the issues of insurgency/counterinsurgency. However, various specialists and experts would be called upon as needed, as contractors, to help the task force. Importantly, the task force would be inclusive of the various United States agencies to capture the community’s collective expertise and get them, as institutions, to “buy in” to the task force. Such agencies would include the CIA, DIA, Department of Defense, DEA, and State Department to name the most prominent.
Creation of a task force with a diverse background of specialists is one part of the solution. To be an effective entity, all members of the task force would have to receive common, centralized training at an insurgency/counterinsurgency education center so they would work in union towards a common concept of an insurgency/counterinsurgency philosophy. Importantly, the education center would be an integral part of the task force and, over time, members of the task force would rotate through both operational and educational positions ensuring a more complete understanding of the insurgency/counterinsurgency issue. Furthermore, service at the education center would be a prized assignment as the task force as a whole would value most a fundamental understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency and the ability to convey this to others.
So, what does the United States gain from such a task force once it is up and running? We can take Iraq for an example. Once the United States leadership decided to invade Iraq in 2002, this leadership would have directed the task force to study the potential for insurgency after the overthrow of the Hussein regime. The task force could have predicted that the Sunni population, which comprises a fifth of the nation, would have an inherent interest in waging a guerrilla war to retain its former standing and influence. If the task force predicted such an outcome, as many independent experts did, then the task force would have subsequently advised the national leadership how to address the expected resistance movement.
The task force’s value, then, is not just in its predictive ability, but in its ability to give expert advice on how to confront an insurgency. As the Iraqi insurgency developed into a coherent movement, the task force would have provided the United States government with expert advice on how to proceed. Without such a task force, deadlyr mistakes by the United States, which could have been avoided, stoked the insurgency in Iraq like a hot poker in a dying fire. The resulting chain of events reflected a political, military, and intelligence community leadership with little or no understanding of insurgency/counterinsurgency issues. An understanding that protecting the populace is more important than protecting yourself could have prevented such catastrophic blunders as Blackwater employees killing innocent people in an unrestrained manner. Understanding that prisons are an extension of the unconventional battlefield could have prevented the embarrassing, criminal, and counterproductive Abu Ghraib incident. Understanding that disbanding the entire Iraqi army and criminalizing Ba’athists could lead to an entrenched insurgency that would eventually kill thousands of American soldiers could have been snipped in the bud. The task force could have saved thousands of American lives, tens of thousands of Iraqi lives, saved the United States billions of dollars, and bolstered the United States' position in the world community.
In conclusion, the creation of a unified insurgency/counterinsurgency task force would better equip the United States to address the issue of insurgency/counterinsurgency wars which have been the dominant form of warfare since the end of World War II and which give every indication of continuing in the future. The current United States involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, and Mexico - to name just a few – underline the seriousness of the issue. An insurgency/counterinsurgency task force would provide an expert, experienced, diverse organization that could help the United States leadership avoid and prevent future counterinsurgency conflicts and help to more effectively resolve them when the United States does become involved. When one looks at the tens of thousands of American lives lost in costly guerrilla wars, from Vietnam to the present, and the impact on the United States economy and world standing, the importance of an insurgency/counterinsurgency task force becomes apparent.
[1] http://www.costofwar.com/ by the National Priorities Project
MAJ Lyon, Student, CGSC, Fort Belvoir, VA
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Monday, May 17, 2010
Major A.Tingle
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Reasons Why I Serve My Country
Since graduating high school, twenty years ago, I have been in the service of my country. Military service is by its very nature a noble undertaking, and there are a number of reasons why someone would want to serve their country. I, like most, aspire to lead an accomplished life--military service helps me fulfill a “higher calling.” For me, the reasons I serve my country are a mix of the pragmatic and intangible. Fate not only directed my career path toward service in the Army, but also enlightened that path. I serve because of my simple monetary obligations, my career aspirations, and my desire for self-actualization. The least important of these reasons is my simple need for employment.
Regardless of the nobility inherent in the service to your country, being an army officer is a job. Most people require some sort of paying job to remain a productive component of society. As simple as it sounds, most people would be unwilling or unable to accept a position as a full-time officer if the pay was insufficient. I am no different. While it seems like a petty reason to serve your country, the fact that it pays an adequate wage is a major reason for undertaking such an obligation. I do not want to over-emphasize monetary motivation in my decision to serve my country. Pay is a minor, yet mandatory, part of why I decided to spend the greater part of my adult life in service to my country. More important to my decision was how fate intervened in my career path.
Chance was a significant part of my decision to join the Army. I started my service immediately after high school when I enlisted as a medic. I initially enlisted because I was presented few options and I wanted to gain some experience and earn money for college--essentially I joined for all the quintessential “recruiting commercial” reasons. Among those reasons was my desire to serve my country. At the time I had no idea what that meant, of what that obligation entailed. Irrespective of my motivations, I had no intention of serving past my initial obligation of four years. The truth is, at the time I was a little concerned at the length of my initial service contract. I think I would have preferred a two year enlistment.
Ironically, I ended up serving just two years before I was given the opportunity to attend the West Point Prepatory School. It was an opportunity I couldn’t pass up and soon I was on my way. After graduating West Point, I had a service obligation of 5 years, but because of September 11th, I was “stop losted” and I did an additional year. I eventually got out, but I came back in the Army as a functional-area officer. Now, after sixteen years on active duty, it is evident that my career path, and thus my service to my country, has been determined as much by fate and circumstance as by desire and planning. I have no regrets, for during those times when my desire to serve my country waned, fate intervened to provide insight, if often after the fact. Fortunately, one of those lessons destiny imparted was on “perspective.”
The most significant reason I serve my country is because it far more rewarding than any other career or job I could practically undertake. Fate taught me my lesson on perspective after I was stop-lossed. I got out of the Army, and while searching for a job I was exposed to numerous government contracting firms and civilian corporations. The prospect of taking one of these jobs left me feeling empty and discouraged. The idea of spending my life working for a company whose only goal is profit was disheartening and embarrassing. The idea of working for Home Depot when I used to work with soldiers was depressing. Eventually I took a job at a consulting firm working on a government contract, and this period of my life gave me the desire to continue to serve my country on active duty.
It has been twenty years since I first signed on to serve my country. While occasionally it has been a hard life, it has been rewarding. What started out as just a job has grown into a career and a lifetime of service to my country. Fate provided me the opportunity to glance into the normal world and see what it is like as a civilian. While I’m thankful for that opportunity, I am happy to serve my country as a full time Army officer.
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Reasons Why I Serve My Country
Since graduating high school, twenty years ago, I have been in the service of my country. Military service is by its very nature a noble undertaking, and there are a number of reasons why someone would want to serve their country. I, like most, aspire to lead an accomplished life--military service helps me fulfill a “higher calling.” For me, the reasons I serve my country are a mix of the pragmatic and intangible. Fate not only directed my career path toward service in the Army, but also enlightened that path. I serve because of my simple monetary obligations, my career aspirations, and my desire for self-actualization. The least important of these reasons is my simple need for employment.
Regardless of the nobility inherent in the service to your country, being an army officer is a job. Most people require some sort of paying job to remain a productive component of society. As simple as it sounds, most people would be unwilling or unable to accept a position as a full-time officer if the pay was insufficient. I am no different. While it seems like a petty reason to serve your country, the fact that it pays an adequate wage is a major reason for undertaking such an obligation. I do not want to over-emphasize monetary motivation in my decision to serve my country. Pay is a minor, yet mandatory, part of why I decided to spend the greater part of my adult life in service to my country. More important to my decision was how fate intervened in my career path.
Chance was a significant part of my decision to join the Army. I started my service immediately after high school when I enlisted as a medic. I initially enlisted because I was presented few options and I wanted to gain some experience and earn money for college--essentially I joined for all the quintessential “recruiting commercial” reasons. Among those reasons was my desire to serve my country. At the time I had no idea what that meant, of what that obligation entailed. Irrespective of my motivations, I had no intention of serving past my initial obligation of four years. The truth is, at the time I was a little concerned at the length of my initial service contract. I think I would have preferred a two year enlistment.
Ironically, I ended up serving just two years before I was given the opportunity to attend the West Point Prepatory School. It was an opportunity I couldn’t pass up and soon I was on my way. After graduating West Point, I had a service obligation of 5 years, but because of September 11th, I was “stop losted” and I did an additional year. I eventually got out, but I came back in the Army as a functional-area officer. Now, after sixteen years on active duty, it is evident that my career path, and thus my service to my country, has been determined as much by fate and circumstance as by desire and planning. I have no regrets, for during those times when my desire to serve my country waned, fate intervened to provide insight, if often after the fact. Fortunately, one of those lessons destiny imparted was on “perspective.”
The most significant reason I serve my country is because it far more rewarding than any other career or job I could practically undertake. Fate taught me my lesson on perspective after I was stop-lossed. I got out of the Army, and while searching for a job I was exposed to numerous government contracting firms and civilian corporations. The prospect of taking one of these jobs left me feeling empty and discouraged. The idea of spending my life working for a company whose only goal is profit was disheartening and embarrassing. The idea of working for Home Depot when I used to work with soldiers was depressing. Eventually I took a job at a consulting firm working on a government contract, and this period of my life gave me the desire to continue to serve my country on active duty.
It has been twenty years since I first signed on to serve my country. While occasionally it has been a hard life, it has been rewarding. What started out as just a job has grown into a career and a lifetime of service to my country. Fate provided me the opportunity to glance into the normal world and see what it is like as a civilian. While I’m thankful for that opportunity, I am happy to serve my country as a full time Army officer.
Friday, May 14, 2010
Leadership
MAJ Greg Soule'
Student
Command & General Staff College
US Army Combined Arms Center
Ft Belvoir, VA
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog are those of the author & do not reflect the official policy or position of the Dept of the Army, Dept of Defense, or US Govt.
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At some point during the transition process while out processing a unit, be it following a staff or command position, a Soldier or Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) invariably approached me and said, “We’re going to miss you sir.” It is these types of exchanges that make departing a bittersweet experience, and yet validate why I continue to serve as an Army officer. The bitterness comes from having to leave behind my cohesive unit that I helped train; the sweetness from the “pat on the back” discussed above. As an Army leader, the most important lesson I’ve learned is you must foster the right climate in order to be an effective leader. The best way I’ve found to foster this climate is by realizing for what purpose you have been placed in that leadership role, and by living and cultivating the Golden Rule within your organization.
First of all, too few officers realize why they exist. Perhaps a requisite slap in the face would do the trick. We have been placed in this unique position of authority over numerous Soldiers, oftentimes being straight out of college, and fail to realize for what purpose. Our purpose as Army officers is not to exercise control over Soldiers, but rather to serve them. I learned this early on in my career, and it helped make me successful as a leader. I don’t mean give Soldiers everything they ask for, but rather be their advocate. Our Soldiers need officers who look out for their best interests.
As a new 2nd Lieutenant (2LT), a Staff Sergeant (SSG) of mine was having trouble with the Housing Office. He would never have approached me with this, but I overheard another conversation and approached him. He lived with his wife and three kids in on-post housing. While renovations were being made, his family was moved from one house to the next. They had moved four times in the past year, and had another move scheduled in a few months. I felt this was unacceptable, but also thought what can I do – I’m just a lieutenant. But I felt compelled because it was the right thing to do. Using my chain-of-command, I raised the issue all the way to the Commanding General. Needless to say, my SSG’s next move was cancelled. I was able to help this SSG and his family, yet the benefit I received within the platoon was priceless. The Soldiers in the platoon saw through my actions that I was there for the right reason. They saw that I would be their advocate – their leader.
Another facet of being an advocate for your Soldiers is playing the role of buffer between them and your higher headquarters. Far too often, commanders and their staffs make decisions in a bubble, without having first-hand knowledge of the true situation. When decisions are made in this manner, there is potential for adverse effects upon your Soldiers. I have learned it is our job as leaders to be the buffer to help prevent these adverse effects from rolling downhill. It is our job, even though it might get you a butt-chewing, to ask why and maybe even present a different course of action for the commander and staff to consider. You might be told no, move out and draw fire…but you might actually change the course of action from time to time. When your Soldiers see you advocating for and caring about them in these ways, you’ll be well on your way toward creating the ideal command climate.
Second, in order to be a proper advocate for Soldiers, you must treat others as you would like to be treated (Golden Rule). Would you like it if your supervisor was always in your face yelling at you, and even took off his ballistic helmet and hit you in the head with it? Granted it was just your pride that was hurt as you still had your helmet on, and some situations call for drastic measures, but using this tactic in every situation is not treating others as you would like to be treated. It is not effective leading.
Sometimes you just need to listen. Everyone has one of those people in their organization where at first you try to quietly slide past their door or cubicle because you know if they hear you you’ll get sucked in to a conversation lasting no less than 45 minutes. I used to despise how this “wasted” what little time I had in each day. Then I started to realize I wasn’t applying the Golden Rule. This person just wanted to be heard. By stopping to listen, I showed them that I cared about what they had to say. I was even surprised that oftentimes I learned something valuable from these discussions.
These two ideals of remembering your purpose as a leader, and treating others with respect by applying the Golden Rule, helped me learn my most important lesson as a leader. The lesson of creating the right climate for effective leadership didn’t really hit home until I started teaching leadership at Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). It wasn’t until I was teaching Cadets how to be effective leaders that I realized I’d been applying these two fundamentals all along. Hopefully, many of these Cadets have gone on to make fine Army officers by becoming Soldier advocates and applying the Golden Rule.
Student
Command & General Staff College
US Army Combined Arms Center
Ft Belvoir, VA
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog are those of the author & do not reflect the official policy or position of the Dept of the Army, Dept of Defense, or US Govt.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At some point during the transition process while out processing a unit, be it following a staff or command position, a Soldier or Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) invariably approached me and said, “We’re going to miss you sir.” It is these types of exchanges that make departing a bittersweet experience, and yet validate why I continue to serve as an Army officer. The bitterness comes from having to leave behind my cohesive unit that I helped train; the sweetness from the “pat on the back” discussed above. As an Army leader, the most important lesson I’ve learned is you must foster the right climate in order to be an effective leader. The best way I’ve found to foster this climate is by realizing for what purpose you have been placed in that leadership role, and by living and cultivating the Golden Rule within your organization.
First of all, too few officers realize why they exist. Perhaps a requisite slap in the face would do the trick. We have been placed in this unique position of authority over numerous Soldiers, oftentimes being straight out of college, and fail to realize for what purpose. Our purpose as Army officers is not to exercise control over Soldiers, but rather to serve them. I learned this early on in my career, and it helped make me successful as a leader. I don’t mean give Soldiers everything they ask for, but rather be their advocate. Our Soldiers need officers who look out for their best interests.
As a new 2nd Lieutenant (2LT), a Staff Sergeant (SSG) of mine was having trouble with the Housing Office. He would never have approached me with this, but I overheard another conversation and approached him. He lived with his wife and three kids in on-post housing. While renovations were being made, his family was moved from one house to the next. They had moved four times in the past year, and had another move scheduled in a few months. I felt this was unacceptable, but also thought what can I do – I’m just a lieutenant. But I felt compelled because it was the right thing to do. Using my chain-of-command, I raised the issue all the way to the Commanding General. Needless to say, my SSG’s next move was cancelled. I was able to help this SSG and his family, yet the benefit I received within the platoon was priceless. The Soldiers in the platoon saw through my actions that I was there for the right reason. They saw that I would be their advocate – their leader.
Another facet of being an advocate for your Soldiers is playing the role of buffer between them and your higher headquarters. Far too often, commanders and their staffs make decisions in a bubble, without having first-hand knowledge of the true situation. When decisions are made in this manner, there is potential for adverse effects upon your Soldiers. I have learned it is our job as leaders to be the buffer to help prevent these adverse effects from rolling downhill. It is our job, even though it might get you a butt-chewing, to ask why and maybe even present a different course of action for the commander and staff to consider. You might be told no, move out and draw fire…but you might actually change the course of action from time to time. When your Soldiers see you advocating for and caring about them in these ways, you’ll be well on your way toward creating the ideal command climate.
Second, in order to be a proper advocate for Soldiers, you must treat others as you would like to be treated (Golden Rule). Would you like it if your supervisor was always in your face yelling at you, and even took off his ballistic helmet and hit you in the head with it? Granted it was just your pride that was hurt as you still had your helmet on, and some situations call for drastic measures, but using this tactic in every situation is not treating others as you would like to be treated. It is not effective leading.
Sometimes you just need to listen. Everyone has one of those people in their organization where at first you try to quietly slide past their door or cubicle because you know if they hear you you’ll get sucked in to a conversation lasting no less than 45 minutes. I used to despise how this “wasted” what little time I had in each day. Then I started to realize I wasn’t applying the Golden Rule. This person just wanted to be heard. By stopping to listen, I showed them that I cared about what they had to say. I was even surprised that oftentimes I learned something valuable from these discussions.
These two ideals of remembering your purpose as a leader, and treating others with respect by applying the Golden Rule, helped me learn my most important lesson as a leader. The lesson of creating the right climate for effective leadership didn’t really hit home until I started teaching leadership at Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). It wasn’t until I was teaching Cadets how to be effective leaders that I realized I’d been applying these two fundamentals all along. Hopefully, many of these Cadets have gone on to make fine Army officers by becoming Soldier advocates and applying the Golden Rule.
Importance of a Fully Developed Commander's Intent*
The most important lesson I have learned thus far in my military career has been the importance of a fully developed commander’s intent. Both the standard definition and the need for a commander’s intent are obvious to most of us. The standard definition includes an articulation of the desired operational end-state as well as quantifications of acceptable loss and criteria for success. A commander’s intent is necessary primarily as a tool to pass the essence of the mission in the absence of other specific orders. The “in order to” section of a mission statement may be expanded in the commander’s intent, as well. Whether on the battlefield or in garrison, a clear and well-understood commander’s intent is often the difference between winning or losing; between good hard training or atrophy of soldiers and units. That said, I believe that a great many commanders stop short in the process of “fully” developing a commander’s intent and thus may unnecessarily lose momentum at some point in the battle.
Allow me to first explain the difference between a text-book commander’s intent and a fully developed commander’s intent. For brevity I will refer to the former as a Standard Commander’s Intent (SCI) and the latter as a Fully Developed Commander’s Intent (FDCI). While both an SCI and an FDCI meet the criteria described above; the FDCI will take an extra step, or two, or ten in the thought process to arrive at definite conclusions about moral and right vs. immoral and wrong. Another key difference is the echelon issuing the guidance. An SCI comes from two echelons up and is incorporated into the unit order. An FDCI should come from as high up as possible. A clear understanding of both the SCI and the FDCI is reflected (or not) in the answers given by the most junior soldier in the unit as to why his unit is executing a particular mission.
It can be said that a junior soldier with a clear understanding of his company commander’s SCI can tell you, for example, that he is conducting his mission to secure key terrain in the vicinity of Objective Blue in order to provide overwatch for friendly forces as they advance toward Objective Green; that he cannot lose his communications equipment; and that success is his continued ability to adjust artillery on any hostile forces threatening in his sector of fires. He understands that. Beyond that he does not have an understanding of the deeper reason for his mission; or at least you should not assume so.
Let’s say, for argument’s sake, that the SCI from our original example (secure key terrain in the vicinity of Objective Blue) wasn’t so skimpy with reasons and also articulated the SCI for the battalion and brigade commanders. Were that the case the junior soldier might also understand that, in the absence of orders, he should continue to fight north up to but not past Phase Line Kentucky - - Excellent! But this is still not an FDCI. An FDCI is much more.
The FDCI must come from the highest possible echelon of command and articulate:
1. The reason for the fight all the way to the root of the conflict.
2. Detailed and quantifiable goals (criteria for success to include losses).
3. The reason that our side is moral and right and the other side is immoral and wrong.
This may sound like a daunting task. You might say that an FDCI would most probably be of such volume that briefing during the orders process would not be practical. You might guess that to verbalize the three items above would only serve to confuse that junior soldier from our earlier example. You would be wrong. It has been done before to great effect. It can be done now. All it takes is the initiative and commitment to formulate and deliver.
An easy example of an FDCI can be extracted from the many wartime speeches of Sir Winston Churchill in his role as Prime Minister of Great Britain: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.[i]" In other speeches Prime Minister Churchill also articulated the root reasons for the conflict and why the survival of Britain and victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany were right and moral goals. These statements of intent, resolve, and moral judgments about right and wrong were on the minds of many if not most Allied service members as they secured key terrain overlooking “Objective Blue”. In the absence of specific orders, Churchill’s FDCI served as the impetus to victory in the long-term conflict.
I submit that if the commanders and men do not now have fixed in their minds the root reason(s) for the fight, the detailed goals, and why our forces are moral and right and the enemy is immoral and wrong then they do not have the benefit of a fully developed commander’s intent. If this is the case then it is likely that at some point friendly forces will lose momentum. An FDCI is what commanders owe to their troops in peacetime and in wartime. The essential nature of imparting an FDCI to one’s subordinates, to my mind, is the most important lesson I have learned thus far in my military career.
Major Lee Sullenger
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
*The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
[i] http://forum.woodenboat.com/showthread.php?p=2580985 quoting an unspecified speech by Sir Winston Churchill.
Allow me to first explain the difference between a text-book commander’s intent and a fully developed commander’s intent. For brevity I will refer to the former as a Standard Commander’s Intent (SCI) and the latter as a Fully Developed Commander’s Intent (FDCI). While both an SCI and an FDCI meet the criteria described above; the FDCI will take an extra step, or two, or ten in the thought process to arrive at definite conclusions about moral and right vs. immoral and wrong. Another key difference is the echelon issuing the guidance. An SCI comes from two echelons up and is incorporated into the unit order. An FDCI should come from as high up as possible. A clear understanding of both the SCI and the FDCI is reflected (or not) in the answers given by the most junior soldier in the unit as to why his unit is executing a particular mission.
It can be said that a junior soldier with a clear understanding of his company commander’s SCI can tell you, for example, that he is conducting his mission to secure key terrain in the vicinity of Objective Blue in order to provide overwatch for friendly forces as they advance toward Objective Green; that he cannot lose his communications equipment; and that success is his continued ability to adjust artillery on any hostile forces threatening in his sector of fires. He understands that. Beyond that he does not have an understanding of the deeper reason for his mission; or at least you should not assume so.
Let’s say, for argument’s sake, that the SCI from our original example (secure key terrain in the vicinity of Objective Blue) wasn’t so skimpy with reasons and also articulated the SCI for the battalion and brigade commanders. Were that the case the junior soldier might also understand that, in the absence of orders, he should continue to fight north up to but not past Phase Line Kentucky - - Excellent! But this is still not an FDCI. An FDCI is much more.
The FDCI must come from the highest possible echelon of command and articulate:
1. The reason for the fight all the way to the root of the conflict.
2. Detailed and quantifiable goals (criteria for success to include losses).
3. The reason that our side is moral and right and the other side is immoral and wrong.
This may sound like a daunting task. You might say that an FDCI would most probably be of such volume that briefing during the orders process would not be practical. You might guess that to verbalize the three items above would only serve to confuse that junior soldier from our earlier example. You would be wrong. It has been done before to great effect. It can be done now. All it takes is the initiative and commitment to formulate and deliver.
An easy example of an FDCI can be extracted from the many wartime speeches of Sir Winston Churchill in his role as Prime Minister of Great Britain: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.[i]" In other speeches Prime Minister Churchill also articulated the root reasons for the conflict and why the survival of Britain and victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany were right and moral goals. These statements of intent, resolve, and moral judgments about right and wrong were on the minds of many if not most Allied service members as they secured key terrain overlooking “Objective Blue”. In the absence of specific orders, Churchill’s FDCI served as the impetus to victory in the long-term conflict.
I submit that if the commanders and men do not now have fixed in their minds the root reason(s) for the fight, the detailed goals, and why our forces are moral and right and the enemy is immoral and wrong then they do not have the benefit of a fully developed commander’s intent. If this is the case then it is likely that at some point friendly forces will lose momentum. An FDCI is what commanders owe to their troops in peacetime and in wartime. The essential nature of imparting an FDCI to one’s subordinates, to my mind, is the most important lesson I have learned thus far in my military career.
Major Lee Sullenger
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
*The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
[i] http://forum.woodenboat.com/showthread.php?p=2580985 quoting an unspecified speech by Sir Winston Churchill.
The Reasons Why I Serve My Country
Major Nicola Thompson
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
"The views expressed in this blog are those of hte author and do not refelct the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."
The purpose of this essay is to provide you with the reasons why I choose to serve my country. However; I have to be totally honest with you, it was not my country I was thinking about initially, it was my family. So if I may, I would like to be a little more specific and share that, in the beginning, I choose to serve my country because my family needed me to join the Army. So I choose to join the Army for the following reasons: financial stability; higher education and the ability to give back.
In December of 1974, I was born to a young girl who was 15 years old, and an even younger boy who had just turned 13 years old. My mother had no idea what to do with me, so she dressed me up like a doll, while my father decided that dolls were not his thing and left us both to play with one another. By the time I was 11 years old, my mother had been married, divorced and given birth to three additional children. My mother worked two jobs; therefore, my siblings and I rarely saw her. This caused me to have to grow up very fast, and being the oldest; I had no choice but to learn the three C’s; cook, clean and change diapers. By the time I was 15 years old, I was already working my first full time job with a worker’s permit. This enabled to assist my mom with the bills, and whatever else pay check did not cover. This brings me to reason number one, financial stability. I told myself at a young age that I did not want to ever find myself in such a financial low that I would need the financial assistance of one of my own children in order to keep a roof over their heads or to help put food on the table. That is an adult responsibility, not a child. The Army kept me from having to wonder where my next paycheck was coming from and whether or not I was going to be able to pay my bills from one month to the next.
It was also at a young age that I realized, in addition to my mother and all of her siblings, that their mother, along with their mother’s mother, were also teenage mothers. Additionally, none of them had an education past high school. It was at that point, around the age of 15, that I could not help asking myself the question “is there a generational curse holding my family hostage?” It was also at that point in my life that I made a conscious effort to beat the odds and break whatever generational boundaries our family had. This brings me to my second reason for joining the Army and serving my country, higher education. I believed that if I could keep from getting pregnant and focus on getting good grades, there would be a strong possibility that I get into a college by earning a scholarship. I did not know where I wanted to go, but I was determined that I was going to go somewhere. When graduation came, I was only given a partial scholarship. This meant I would have to find a way to earn the rest, and that’s where the Army Reserve Officer Training Core (ROTC) came into play. I read about the ROTC program at my college and learned that there was an opportunity for me to earn an additional scholarship that would pay for my school, housing and potentially pay me a check monthly. All I needed to know at that point was where to sign up.
This brings me to my third and final reason of wanting to give back. After watching my mother work two jobs for the better part of her life, I desired to be in a position where I could take care of her one day. Besides, it was because of having to raise her kids at such a young age that helped me get through my teenage years without getting pregnant; it was the best birth control I could have ever had. She was also responsible for me working hard at getting into college, because I was so determined not to have to put my kids through the burden of working while trying to get through high school. And finally, she showed me that hard work, determination, and faith in God could get me through any trial and tribulation.
I know that none of this talked specifically to my country; however, I believe that my family is every bit of this country to me. The war I had to fight started long before I joined the Army, and I know that I have carried all of those leadership skills and tactics with me to the far country of Iraq. The Army gave me financial stability, a higher education, and the ability to give back to my family, and in exchange, I have given the Army 100% of my lessons learned from my childhood. I am extremely hard working and will not stop until the mission is complete. I am dedicated and loyal to those with whom I serve. And I plan to remain in the fight, because ultimately, I needed the Army and now my country needs me.
Student, Command and General Staff School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
"The views expressed in this blog are those of hte author and do not refelct the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."
The purpose of this essay is to provide you with the reasons why I choose to serve my country. However; I have to be totally honest with you, it was not my country I was thinking about initially, it was my family. So if I may, I would like to be a little more specific and share that, in the beginning, I choose to serve my country because my family needed me to join the Army. So I choose to join the Army for the following reasons: financial stability; higher education and the ability to give back.
In December of 1974, I was born to a young girl who was 15 years old, and an even younger boy who had just turned 13 years old. My mother had no idea what to do with me, so she dressed me up like a doll, while my father decided that dolls were not his thing and left us both to play with one another. By the time I was 11 years old, my mother had been married, divorced and given birth to three additional children. My mother worked two jobs; therefore, my siblings and I rarely saw her. This caused me to have to grow up very fast, and being the oldest; I had no choice but to learn the three C’s; cook, clean and change diapers. By the time I was 15 years old, I was already working my first full time job with a worker’s permit. This enabled to assist my mom with the bills, and whatever else pay check did not cover. This brings me to reason number one, financial stability. I told myself at a young age that I did not want to ever find myself in such a financial low that I would need the financial assistance of one of my own children in order to keep a roof over their heads or to help put food on the table. That is an adult responsibility, not a child. The Army kept me from having to wonder where my next paycheck was coming from and whether or not I was going to be able to pay my bills from one month to the next.
It was also at a young age that I realized, in addition to my mother and all of her siblings, that their mother, along with their mother’s mother, were also teenage mothers. Additionally, none of them had an education past high school. It was at that point, around the age of 15, that I could not help asking myself the question “is there a generational curse holding my family hostage?” It was also at that point in my life that I made a conscious effort to beat the odds and break whatever generational boundaries our family had. This brings me to my second reason for joining the Army and serving my country, higher education. I believed that if I could keep from getting pregnant and focus on getting good grades, there would be a strong possibility that I get into a college by earning a scholarship. I did not know where I wanted to go, but I was determined that I was going to go somewhere. When graduation came, I was only given a partial scholarship. This meant I would have to find a way to earn the rest, and that’s where the Army Reserve Officer Training Core (ROTC) came into play. I read about the ROTC program at my college and learned that there was an opportunity for me to earn an additional scholarship that would pay for my school, housing and potentially pay me a check monthly. All I needed to know at that point was where to sign up.
This brings me to my third and final reason of wanting to give back. After watching my mother work two jobs for the better part of her life, I desired to be in a position where I could take care of her one day. Besides, it was because of having to raise her kids at such a young age that helped me get through my teenage years without getting pregnant; it was the best birth control I could have ever had. She was also responsible for me working hard at getting into college, because I was so determined not to have to put my kids through the burden of working while trying to get through high school. And finally, she showed me that hard work, determination, and faith in God could get me through any trial and tribulation.
I know that none of this talked specifically to my country; however, I believe that my family is every bit of this country to me. The war I had to fight started long before I joined the Army, and I know that I have carried all of those leadership skills and tactics with me to the far country of Iraq. The Army gave me financial stability, a higher education, and the ability to give back to my family, and in exchange, I have given the Army 100% of my lessons learned from my childhood. I am extremely hard working and will not stop until the mission is complete. I am dedicated and loyal to those with whom I serve. And I plan to remain in the fight, because ultimately, I needed the Army and now my country needs me.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
The Most Important Lesson
The most significant lesson I have learned as a leader is to take care of Soldiers. I believe that taking care of Soldiers is a leader’s primary job and that Soldiers will accomplish any mission if they feel their leader has their best interests in mind. Taking care of Soldiers is significant for multiple reasons. First, my experience has been, that Soldiers who feel that leaders take care of them have higher morale and are more successful than Soldiers who feel neglected by their leaders. Additionally, every leader should recognize that the Soldiers and junior Officers they lead will soon lead the Army of the future. These junior leaders are shaped by their experiences. Leaders who provide quality leadership by taking care of Soldiers serve as an example that will be replicated in future formations. Finally, I have learned that taking care of Soldiers is a more nuanced task than it first appears. Understanding just what taking care of Soldiers means in a given situation is crucial to success. Subordinates that feel their leader cares for them are more likely to accomplish the mission and more likely to be leaders of character in the future. Today’s leader must recognize this requirement while simultaneously understanding the intricacies of how to take care of subordinates.
I believe that the Army is primarily about people. Individual units are often defined by their capabilities. However, in conversations with leaders of all ranks, I hear repeatedly that Soldiers are what make organizations great. Soldiers who feel they are taken care of are more likely to accomplish the mission regardless of their specialty. Leaders must take care of subordinates in order to be successful in their mission whether deployed or at home.
I have always been cognizant of the significance my leadership has on shaping subordinate’s leadership styles, both in the near-term and over the course of their careers. In my brief career, I have had subordinates who went on to fill various roles throughout the Army. It was important for me to take care of them so they would recognize the significance leaders have on their units. If I was successful, these leaders will continue providing quality leadership in the future that places the needs of their Soldiers above their own. As significant as taking care of Soldier is, it is not a simple task.
Taking care of Soldiers is difficult to define. In certain situations, almost any action can be defended as taking care of Soldiers. Leaders must recognize what is truly taking care of Soldiers and be able to discern that from tasks and privileges that do not truly benefit subordinates. Often, releasing Soldiers early from duty is recognized within a unit as taking care of Soldiers. While releasing Soldiers early may sometimes legitimately be taking care of them, this is not the essence of what a good leader does to take care of his or her Soldiers. In fact, there is not a basic checklist of items that should be done. Instead, taking care of Soldiers is a concept. Leaders must internalize the task of protecting, shaping, and training their Soldiers. Taking care of Soldiers means preparing them to accomplish their mission in the toughest environment imaginable while simultaneously arming them with the tools they need to be successful. These tools include life skills, coping skills, military training, and a plethora of other requirements. Sometimes it means releasing them early and sometimes it means taking them to the field to work through the weekend on a challenging task. It is these nuances of taking care of Soldiers that are often neglected, but they should be considered by leaders at every level.
Leaders are tasked to accomplish missions. Subordinates that are well taken care of are more likely to accomplish these missions to standard and on time because they are motivated to contribute to the goals of the organization. These well led Soldiers are likely to continue to take care of their Soldiers throughout their career. Taking care of Soldiers requires that a leader invest time in determining what is truly important and what will aid Soldiers to be successful, both in the Army and in life.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
MAJ Victor Deekens
Student, ILE
Fort Belvoir, VA
I believe that the Army is primarily about people. Individual units are often defined by their capabilities. However, in conversations with leaders of all ranks, I hear repeatedly that Soldiers are what make organizations great. Soldiers who feel they are taken care of are more likely to accomplish the mission regardless of their specialty. Leaders must take care of subordinates in order to be successful in their mission whether deployed or at home.
I have always been cognizant of the significance my leadership has on shaping subordinate’s leadership styles, both in the near-term and over the course of their careers. In my brief career, I have had subordinates who went on to fill various roles throughout the Army. It was important for me to take care of them so they would recognize the significance leaders have on their units. If I was successful, these leaders will continue providing quality leadership in the future that places the needs of their Soldiers above their own. As significant as taking care of Soldier is, it is not a simple task.
Taking care of Soldiers is difficult to define. In certain situations, almost any action can be defended as taking care of Soldiers. Leaders must recognize what is truly taking care of Soldiers and be able to discern that from tasks and privileges that do not truly benefit subordinates. Often, releasing Soldiers early from duty is recognized within a unit as taking care of Soldiers. While releasing Soldiers early may sometimes legitimately be taking care of them, this is not the essence of what a good leader does to take care of his or her Soldiers. In fact, there is not a basic checklist of items that should be done. Instead, taking care of Soldiers is a concept. Leaders must internalize the task of protecting, shaping, and training their Soldiers. Taking care of Soldiers means preparing them to accomplish their mission in the toughest environment imaginable while simultaneously arming them with the tools they need to be successful. These tools include life skills, coping skills, military training, and a plethora of other requirements. Sometimes it means releasing them early and sometimes it means taking them to the field to work through the weekend on a challenging task. It is these nuances of taking care of Soldiers that are often neglected, but they should be considered by leaders at every level.
Leaders are tasked to accomplish missions. Subordinates that are well taken care of are more likely to accomplish these missions to standard and on time because they are motivated to contribute to the goals of the organization. These well led Soldiers are likely to continue to take care of their Soldiers throughout their career. Taking care of Soldiers requires that a leader invest time in determining what is truly important and what will aid Soldiers to be successful, both in the Army and in life.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
MAJ Victor Deekens
Student, ILE
Fort Belvoir, VA
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